A complete information bargaining model à la Rubinstein is amended to accommodate "irrational types" who are obstinate, and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands. (Dwayne Benjamin, Toronto PPG 1002H)----- The Rubenstein model suggests that the costs of delay, combined with forward-looking rationality, leads parties to. Based on the Rubinstein bargaining model, we can fairly distribute the surplus profit. However, the last one is not SPE because precisely in Rubinstein's model (and in other bargaining models), it is assumed that if player B is faced with two options that have the same payoff (when involves accepting, and the other rejecting), then he accepts. Part 3: Example of bargaining foundation of a competitive outcome. Rusinowska (2002) Subgame perfect equilibria in model with bargaining costs varying in time, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 56: 303-313; Rusinowska (2002) On certain generalization of Rubinstein’s bargaining model, International Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory, and Algebra 12: 545-552, Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Let X = P x 2